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ABSTRACT
The problem of deciding whethc c or not to test market a new product
is re-considered against the possibility that competitors might be able
to observe our test results and enter the market themselves. It is shown
how the decision problem can be couched in terms of a Bayesian decision
tree, where the competitive reactions are added outcomes. Some complica-
tions arise in assessing the competitive entry probabilities, however,
since they cannot be seen as independent of market sales probabilities.
Accordingly, the competitive entry probabilities are modeled as explicit
functions of the testing firm's priors over market sales, and the test
outcomes. The ensuing decision problem can be solved using stochastic
dynamic programming. A numerical example is developed for a computer
coded version of the model, and a sensitivity analysis of the optimal
first-period decision is carried out.

Introduction
One problem that test marketing of new products gives rise to is
when to stop the relatively expensi/e testing program and make a final
decision to "go" or "drop" the product. This can be seen as a sequen-
tial sampling problem perhaps with a Bayesian interpretation (Bass, 1963;
Green and Tull, 1970). Lately, one additional problem in test marketing
has complicated a straightforward sampling approach, however. With the
rapid increase in the availability of commercial market data during the
sixties and seventies, the probability that one or more competitors will
discover the tested product and its sale becomes often very high. As many
new products are easily imitated and produced, these competitors may then
decide to go nationtTide even before the testing firm does. Then the deci-
sion as to whether to go or drop or continue testing clearly becomes a
matter not only of expected market sales, but also of the magnitude and
timing of competitive reaction.
This paper shows how test marketing under these conditions can be
handled as a dynamic programming problem incorporating both the ideas of
Bayesian sampling and probabilistic competitive actions in developing
the appropriate decision whether or not to test market, and when to stop
testing.
In many cases the test marketing is carried out for new markets or market
segments. In such a case there would be no necessary delay in competitive
response since the product already exists.
2
Alternatively, the usual test marketing setup can be abolished in favor of
an "in-home" testing approach which eliminates the problem of competitive
discovery. The validity and reliability of the results generated by such
an approach would generally be less than for the test market design, however
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Modeling Framework
It is assumed that the choice alternatives open to the testing
firm are to go nationwide (GO) , to drop the new product (DROP) , or to
test market (TEST) . The competitors will be assumed to either start
production and distribution (COGO) at a given decision point or else
wait for additional information (CONOGO) . It is assumed that no com-
petitor is planning a new product introduction or test marketing of his
own before the testing firm has made the first period decision. Further-
more, competitive reaction after a GO or DROP decision is independent of
the testing (it is presumably only dependent upon actual sales results)
and thus not considered here explicitly.
It is further assumed that the testing firm can assess the relia-
bility of the test market results fairly accurately. This assumption
is not very unrealistic if, for example, the firm has done testing of
new products earlier, or if standard statistical techniques are used.
This paper will not be concerned directly with the issues involved in
this research, but will treat choice of test area(s) and size of
sample(s) (of stores and/or individuals) as given and fixed.
Throughout the discussion it will be assumed that the price of the
product, and the promotional effort in the introductory stages will be
the same regardless of the timing of the introduction; real world devia-
tions from this assumption could be developed for the particular case,
but yield nothing of principal interest in this context. It is also
assumed that the test marketing is carried out for the purpose of ascer-
taining probable total sales, and that no alternative marketing mix
programs are to be evaluated. Also, the effect of alternative marketing
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programs either by the testing firm or its competitors upon the total
market sales is assumed negligible.
The basic model will first be developed, and a Bayesian solution
to the sequential sampling problem indicated. The next sections deal
with the incorporation of the competitive effects: the number of
capable entrants, their expected payoffs, and their probability of
entry. Finally, the complete model will be solved for a specific
example using standard dynamic programming techniques.
The Basic Model
The test marketing problem can be conveniently represented through
the decision trees in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In Figure 1 the conven-
tional testing problem without competitive entry is depicted. The sim-
plicity of the tree is readily apparent, with repeated acts and events
following each other symmetrically. In Figure 2, on the other hand,
the competitive entry is explicitly accounted for. Here the symmetry
is broken by the fact that competitors are only of concern in certain
2
situations. We assume that compet'tors will become alerted to the
potential market only via our testing or entry. Hence, it makes sense
to postulate that after the first stage our testing firm has the first
There have been cases where competitors have "disrupted" test marketing
areas by unusual promotional efforts. Such actions will clearly affect
the accuracy of the test market results, and thus the test likelihoods.
These actions are not considered in the present model.
One could have made the tree completely symmetrically also here by
allowing competitive event branches with probabilities of zero and
one to be inserted. Since the number of branches increases very fast
and thus computational costs increase fast, however, even without
competitive entry, they have been eliminated wherever feasible.
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opportunity to enter the market. If we decide to continue testing,
however, the alerted competitors who are able to enter might do so
without waiting for the second period's test results. This means
that competitors can at the earliest enter in the second period, and
that we have the opportunity to run at least one test period and
still be the first entrant.
Another feature incorporated in the tree of Figure 2 is that once
a competitor has entered, our test option disappears. It seems likely
that there would never be a case where our testing should be continued
in such a case (an exception might be where a contract has been signed
with the testing organization, and a certain minimum number of periods
has been posted) since the problem has presumably lost its importance.
Finally, if we have decided to enter (or drop) the competitive reac-
tion is seen as of no importance; as stated before, our market (not
test) sales would presumably determine their reaction.
Figure 1 and 2 about here
The time period between the decision making points is equal to
the time it takes for the test results to appear — a common interval
is two weeks to one month. It is assumed that the testing will not go
on indefinitely; thus, the end stage of the two decision trees provides
only the GO and DROP alternative actions.
Following the test results, the likelihoods of alternative sales
and of alternative competitive reactions are computed — it is the joint
probabilities of these events that are of interest to the decision
maker. Let us first concentrate upon the sales probabilities.
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If sales a priori is assumed to have a certain (say, normal or
lognormal) distribution with specified mean and standard deviation,
the test information can be used to derive an appropriate posterior.
The existence of a prior distribution with specified parameters is no
unrealistic assumption here; presumably a product to be test marketed
has shown some initial promise.
In assigning the weight of the new test information relative to
the priors, the reliability of the testing has to be assessed. This
hinges directly on the likelihoods of the test: the probabilities of
various test outcomes, given alternative true market sales.
These probabilities can be directly assessed when the test informa-
tion can be seen as coming from a random sample; the standard errors
serve directly to indicate the appropriate probabilities... In the case
where the test market only yields one observation on sales for a period,
the updating can be done by defining the likelihoods directly (see, e.g.
Bass, 1963, p. 78).
Let us turn then to the possibility of competitive reaction. It
is clear that a fairly large potential market — uncovered by the test
market information — will be less attractive in proportion to the
amount of competition and consequent decrease in market share. Accor-
dingly, the posterior probabilities should be adjusted by the probability
of competitive reactions.
The Problem of Competitive Entry
First a preliminary overview. It will be assumed that the testing
firm ("our" firm) can establish a list of N potential entrants besides
itself. Many of these will not be capable of entering the market directly,
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However, as the number of stages of testing approaches the end of the
planning horizon T and thus time increases, successively more of them
will become capable of entering win their own produce. Their willing-
ness to enter hinges primarily on two factors. One is the market sales,
as indicated by the test results. Another is the differential of these
sales that accrue to the first entrant. If this latter "bonus" is
small, for example, the competitors might well wait until our firm
enters full-scale. Conversely, if the bonus is high, the competitors
able to enter might attempt a risky early entry which is compensated
by the large gains possible.
Similarly, these two factors will affect our firm's entry decision.
In addition, however, the early firms, especially ours, would derive
some additional gains from entering before other firms are capable of
entering. This gain would be reduced by the others' later entry, but
will constitute an initial gain that could be quite substantial at
times.
The Number of Capable Entrants
The simplest approach to the determination of the number of capable
entrants, N'(t), (N 1 (t)
_< N) , t - 1, 2,..., T, is to develop a checklist
of the factors that affect a firm's ability to develop the new product
and market it. Then a particular firm can be rated on the checklist
factors, and only those firms scoring higher than some critical level
on all the factors will be moved into the "capable" or "active" group.
Since over time many firms will be able to develop the necessary capa-
bilities, the critical question to ask for each factor is how many time
periods will elapse before the requisite critical level is reached.
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Checklists similar to this are common in much of business deci-
sion making (see, for example, Kotler, 1971, pp. 113, 271, and 326).
For the particular product our firm should have little difficulty in
developing the appropriate factors to check. As an example, the fac-
tors incorporated in Figure 3 would generally be of importance. In
the figure a particular company will go into the group of entrants
corresponding to its longest time lag.
Figure 3 about here
In what follows, it will be assumed that there has been derived a
vector N'of values on N'(t), t - 1, 2,... , T, with N' (1) ± N' (2) < ...
_< N'(T) _< N. These numbers are treated as deterministic, but could
equally well be regarded as the expected values of the N'(t).
The Payoffs to Entry
Given that a competitor is able to enter, his actual behavior de-
pends upon the evaluation of the test results. Most likely, the action
taken depends upon the forecasted t lies In the market and the market
share he thinks he can get:
(l) p(cogo|t) - e p(cogo|s) p(s|t)
S
where P(SjT) can be derived in the same manner as for our firm, and
(2) P(COGO|S) - f(S, MS )
where MS
n
denotes the n'th firm's market share (n - 1, 2,..., N)
.
The probabilistic interpretation would be especially appropriate if
it was assumed that not all competitors might observe the test results.
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Start with the first potential entrant
V
When will this firm notice the test results?
t=l t=2
_*L
t=3
iL
t=4
:k. ii
t=5
JL
7K
When does this firm have the required capital to product the product?
t-1 t=2 t=3
JL
t=4
±. iL ±
t=5
When does this firm possess the necessary know-how to produce and market?
t=l t=2
±.
t=3
^L
t=4
^L
t=5
±.
When does this firm have the required production facilities'
t=l t=2 t=3
SJL
t=4
IL
t=5
When does this firm have the required distributive facilities?
t=l t=2 t=3
±.
t=4
V
t=5
y_
Is this firm an innovative, dynamic firm, or a conservative "follower? 1
t=l t=2
V
t=3
XL
t=4
\/
t=5
N , (1)=N'(1)+1 N' (2)=N ! (2)+l N'(3)=N' (3)+l N 1 (4)=N' (4)+l N' (T)=N' (T)+l
t=l t=2 t=3
>L
t=4
y/ iL
t=5
_^_
*lReturn for the next competitor
Figure 3
Checklist for deriving N' (t), t = 1,2,...,T,
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S refers to market sales and T to test information. We make the assump-
tion that.P(s|T) is the same for the competition as for our firm, which
implies that we ascribe our priors to them. Such an assumption is not
unrealistic if these potential entrants are at all similar to our firm.
This they might very well be since they are all capable of producing
the product by the time they are grouped into the active category dealt
with here. Let us then focus upon the second relationship, the P(COGO|S).
Basically, the total market can be seen as divided up into two cate-
gories of customers. One consists of these buyers who stay loyal to the
first entrant whoever he may be. The customers in this group will often
belong to the "pioneers," those willing to try out a new product and ther
staying with it as imitations appear. The other group comprises the
buyers who basically develop their brand preferences on the basis of
comparative trials of several brands. Unless better forecast data are
available to our firm, we will assume that this portion of the total
market will distribute itself between the entered brands in proportion
to these brands' market shares in related markets. Since these relative!
easily imicated products for the rust part constitute product line exten-
sions, such art assumption relating to existing competitive situations is
not very unrealistic. If no existing markets similar to the one con-
templated exists, subjective evaluations by management will have to be
established
. (on such subjective evaluatioiis , see the procedures developed
by Schlaifer, 1969).
That group of customers not loyal to the first entrant will comprise
some buyers who would perhaps buy a competing brand not yet in the mar-
ket, rather than the one actually bought. This will not change until the
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new brand enters, and thus in the meantime., the early entrants (including
our firm) .will capitalize on the situation. It seems likely that this
share of the market will also divide itself up between the existing brands
according to their market shares in related markets. As we can assume
that the firms entering will be those in the active group, we divide
this "transient" part (DS) of the market according to:
(3) DSnt - (100-DMS)*S*(100-MSSN )*MSn/MSSN , (t)
where
^N'Ct)
=
* ^
N'(t)
Z
n=0
with MS denoting our firm's market share, and the subscripts in DSnt ,
denoting the entering firm n at t, n = 0, 1, 2,..., N'(t), t 1, 2,..., T.
Here DMS denotes the share, in percentages, of the total market that goes
to the first entrant (0 <: DMS < 100).
Since this transient share of the market will not stay constant
over time as competitors enter, it becomes necessary to compute an average
payoff for each period within the planning horizon. This average will
differ depending upon the time period of entry. If we denote the time
of entry as t*, t* = 1, 2,..., T, we can compute the rate at which DS
T
decreases as'
nt
1
T N'(t)
(4) TR(t*) = 1 - ( Z Z
1
MS W(T+l-t*)
,
t* - 1, 2,..., T.
A discount factor could be easily introduced to account for preferences
over timing of payoffs, but is suppressed here.
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The total expected sales for the n'th potential entrant becomes:
(5) Snt
= (100-DMS)*S*MS
n
+ DS *TR(t*=t) + (DMS)S
if the n'th firm is the first, and
(6) S . = (100-DMS)*S*MS + DS *TR(t*=t)
nt n nt
if the n'th firm is not first, with t = 1, 2,..., T, and n = 0, 1, 2,...,
N'(t).
In the model presented the competitors and our firm are treated
symmetrically. One advantage accruing to our firm, however, is the
possibility we have of entering as soon as one competitor has entered.
In addition, if our firm derides to enter relatively early, there will
be no competition about the DS share until some other firm is capable
of entering. In some cases where the "tooling up" for entry is time
consuming, such an advantage could of course be decisive.
One last feature of the model is needed before most real world situa-
tions are appropriately accounted for. Because the new product might
need a fairly long period of introduction (before reaching the growth
stage) , it will sometimes be useful to incorporate a market sales curve
over the planning horizon which can take on a non-linear shape. Since
it is hardly likely that the saturation level of the life cycle curve
will be encountered within the T time periods, the most attractive alter-
native to a constant level:
(7) S
t
,
= S
,
would perhaps be
U'+l)b
(8) S
t ,+1 - S t ,
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where t' measures the number of time periods from the time of intro-
duction, and where b, (b _> 0) , indicates the rate of increase in the
slope. The initialization of S t » Vvould be computed on the basis of
the test results at t 1 = 1.
The Probability of Competitive Entry
Sofar we have assessed which competitors would be capable of
entering, and what their expected sales (S .) would be given market
sales (S) . The next step is to predict the probability of competitive
entry on the basis of these figures.
First the sales estimate, S ., has to be translated into profits
(assuming sales alone is insufficient) taking into account cost figures
as well as possible non-linearities of the competitors' objective func-
tions. In the absence of specific data on the competitors, the costs
can be taken as proportional to ours, and the objective function the
same as ours. Where more data on the competitors exist, appropriate
changes in these assumptions are straightforward to accomodate. Thus,
we can write
(9)
"nt ' Snt '
C
nt
and
( 10 > Unt ' a + al "nt " a2 ^t 2
where tt .stands for firm n's profit from entering first at t, C and
nt r & nt
U similarly for costs and objective function respectively, and aQ, a-p
and a2 constants (non-negative) of the objective function.
Strictly speaking, only a, and a^ are needed since a« does not enter the
maximization argument. If the objective is linear in profits, we might
as well work with profits directly.
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Once the U has heen derived for firm n, the next step is to trans-
nt
late the payoffs into a statement of the probability that firm n will
enter. Generally, the higher the \ lyoff the more likely would be an entry.
It seems quite likely, furthermore, that for relatively low utilities
the probability of entry should stay low, whereas reasonably high payoffs
might push the probability close to one. A functional form which exhi-
bits these characteristics and which also limits the probability to the
necessary 0-to-l range is the following logistic:
(11) P
nt (COGO|S) - b Unt
1 /(l + b^" 1 )
1
where bg and b^ are constants bg > and bi > 1.
Thus, for a given level of market sales (S) we can compute the dif-
ferent P (COGO |S), n » 1,..., N'(t), at any time period t. These pro-
babilities will generally vary between firms, since their DS
fc
in (3)
will differ. The probability that no competitor will enter at t is equal
to
(12) P t (CONOGOJS) - (1 - Plt (C0GO|S))(l - P (COGOJS)) (1 -
PN , (t)t (COGO|S)) ,
and the probability of entry becomes
(13) P
t
(COGO|S) - 1 - P
t
(CONOGO|S).
Finally, we use our distribution of S from the priors and later up-
dated as posteriors to compute the desired probability in (1)
:
This probability function and the previous objective function are both
weighting the basic profit figures, and could clearly be consolidated
into one function by substitution. Conceptually, the segregated approach
becomes much more enlightening, however, which would generally be to the
advantage of the management.
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(14) P(COGO|T) = e p (cogo|s) p(s|t)
,
S t
for the probability of competitive entry after the test results are in,
and
(15) P(C0N0GO|T) = 1 - P(COGOJT) ,
for the corresponding probability of no entry. These are the probabili-
ties we need to complete the specification of the decision tree in Figure 2.
Once they are derived, the usual backward induction approach of stochastic
dynamic programming can be utilized for the assessment of optimal first-
stage decision, and later-stage decisions condition al upon test outcomes.
It is clear that in the case where management is relatively certain
regarding its judgment of the probability of entry, this elaborate modeling
need not be carried out. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a
clear specification of what steps logically have to be taken in order to
arrive at the probabilities will often help to clarify where particular
bits of information and judgment should be properly placed. As always
in the analysis of future competitive notions, no determinate and failsafe
formula is possible to produce, but it is to be hoped that models such
as the one presented here will assist management in making more enlightened
decisions.
A Numerical Example
To see how the model framework presented can be used in an applied
setting, a computer code was written and a simulated case was run. Apart
from the priors over various market sales outcomes and the test likeli-
hoods, inputs of DMS , the share going to the first entrant, of the N'
vector of the number of capable entrants, and of the market shares in
related markets (the MS
n ,
n := 1,..., N) were needed. These parameter
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values and the values assigned the parameters of the objective functions
and the probability functions are exhibited in Table 1. In addition to
the run at initial values, a sensitivity analysis was carried out for
the N'(t), and for the DMS values, using the values that are indicated
in Table 2. Clearly, additional sensitivity analyses could be carried
out for the other parameters as well (and should be done in a real appli-
cation)
,
but for the model developed the parameters chosen represent less
common concepts and would thus be of special interest.
The results of the runs are presented in Table 2. For the initial
parameterization, the optimal first-period decision is to "GO"—the pos-
sible entry of the competitors in successive periods makes testing a non-
optimal choice. To see how sensitive this solution is to the assumption
of possible competitive entry, a similar run was made but with no entry
possible. As can be seen in the Table, the result is that the test mar-
keting should be carried out. Thus, if the assessment of the likelihood
of competitive entry is correct, the firm would do better on the average
not to test market the new product, although the standard analysis points
in the other direction. Although Table 2 only shows a limited set of
runs, it is clear that the optimal decision is quite sensitive to compe-
titive entry.
In Table 2 are also presented the results from some runs using
alternative levels of DMS, the share going to the first entrant. As
can be seen, as long as no competitive entry is possible within the four-
period horizon, the DMS level does not matter. This is of course as
expected, since it means that we can take our time before entry and
still count on the DMS share. As can be seen from the Table, the DMS
becomes important, however, when the number of possibly entering compe-
titors goes up. It is interesting to note that in the case where the

-18-
DMS is relatively low, but the number of competitors able to enter is
high, the preferred decision is to drop the product from further considera-
tion. Clearly the threat of competitive entry combined with fairly low
gains makes the new product opportunity of little promise.
Discussion
Clearly, these sensitivity results are of limited generality. Never-
theless, they point out the fact that the possibility of entry by compe-
titors on the basis of test market sales data needs to be considered by
the new product tester. The approach suggested here basically presents
a flexible framework within which the question of such competitive entry
can analyzed. As such, it serves the function of isolating the many
considerations which have to be taken into account when a firm analyzes
and attempts to predict its competitors' behavior. Also, for the case
where reasonable parameter values can be assessed by managers, the solu-
tion can easily be obtained.
Several extensions are possible. First, the possibility of compe-
titive reactions other than entry *ould be accounted for. This refers
particularly to the case mentioned earlier where competitors change
their marketing mix in the test areas, thereby severely affecting the
reliability of the sales figures observed. Such a procedure will have
to be accounted for by modeling the test likelihoods as functions of
competitive actions. A second extension is to use the program inter-
actively, so that management decision makers can easily simulate the
effects of changing parameter values. This last possibility offers the
best chance of management acceptance of the model, and also allows for
continual updating as new information and experiences are incorporated.
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TABLE 1
A Numerical Example
Parameter Values for the Initial Run
No. of Decisions: 3 (GO, TEST, and DROP)
No. of Sales Levels: 2
No. of Test Outcomes: 2
No. of Drop Outcomes: 1
No. of Competitive actions: 2 (GO, NOGO)
No. of Periods : 4
Priors: P(sales=high) = .55
P(sales=low) .45
Test Likelihoods:
P(test high | sales high) = .8
P(test low | sales high) .2
P(test high | sales low) * .3
P(test low | sales low) = .7
Payoffs: Sales high = 140.0
Sales low = 10.0
Drop - 35.0
Test cost per period: 21.0
Number of competitors considered: 4
DMS - .25
MS = .25; MS = .15; MS
3
- .35; MS
4
- .15; MS
5
«
.
(m
i
is our firm)
10
Entry ability: N' : (12 3 4)
Parameters of the competitors' probability function: Dq = .01; b]_ «* 1.1
Our objective function: Linear
Competitors objective function: Linear
Discount rate applied: 0.0
Market Sales overtime: S fcl . =S+ , , t' = 1 , 2, . . . , T.t +x «
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TABLE 2
Results from the Numerical Example: Optimal First-Period Decision
(1111)
Alternative N'
(1 1 1 A) (12 3 4) (15 5 5)
Alternative
DMS
.20 TEST TEST DROP DROP
.25 TEST TEST GO GO
.30 TEST TEST GO GO
Initial run.
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